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Rationale behind IPO Underpricing:
Evidence from Asian REIT IPOs
Joseph T.L. Ooi,* Masaki Mori** and Woei-Chyuan Wong***
This article examines the rationale behind IPO underpricing using a sample
of REIT IPOs in Asia. Although the IPOs registered an average initial return of
3.08%, the issuers were able to sell the IPO shares above their fundamental
values by timing the listings in periods when existing REIT stocks are traded at a
premium to their net asset values (NAV). An IPO could therefore be underpriced
and yet produce a net gain for the issuer. The issuers’ net gain from IPO is,
however, negatively related to long-run performance of REIT IPOs.
Introduction
In the financial market, issuers face the challenge of establishing the right
offer price for an initial public offering (IPO). One puzzling aspect is that
IPOs are often underpriced, that is, their first day closing market price is
higher than the offer price, by as much as 10–24%.1 If the shares were sold
at the first day closing price, the IPO proceeds would have been higher by
an amount equal to the IPO underpricing, or the same proceeds could have
been raised by selling fewer shares (Loughran and Ritter 2002). This puzzle
stems from the difficulty of measuring the fundamental value of a new firm.
The first-day closing market price is usually assumed to be the intrinsic value
of the shares, but this might not necessarily be true in an inefficient market
characterized by investors’ heterogeneity and short sales constraints (Miller
1977, Daniel Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam 1998, Ritter and Welch 2002,
Derrien 2005).
In this article, we measure the fundamental value of a new firm using its net
asset value (NAV), which represents the residual claims of shareholders in
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1See Rock (1986), Tinic (1988), Allen and Faulhaber (1989), Benveniste and Spindt
(1989), Grinblatt and Hwang (1989), Habib and Ljungqvist (2001), Loughran and Rit-
ter (2002), Lowry and Shu (2002), Ritter and Welch (2002), Derrien (2005), Ljungqvist
(2008) and Liu and Ritter (2011).
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the event that the firm is liquidated after paying off all of its debts. The NAV
valuation approach is more suited for firms owning tangible assets that have
well-determined market prices, such as holding companies that invest in real
estate assets.2 For this reason, we focus on the IPOs of real estate investment
trusts (REITs), which are special investment entities set up for investing in
and owning real estate assets. By regulation, at least 75% of a REIT’s assets
must be invested in tangible real estate. A REIT must also distribute at least
90% of its net income as dividends to its shareholders, making its dividend
flow and growth rate more predictable. This reduces the role of asymmetric
information, one of the most popular explanations for IPO underpricing.3 Our
study focuses on IPOs of equity REITs listed on four stock exchanges in Asia,
namely, Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore and Malaysia. The listing conditions
in these markets specifically require issuers to report and substantiate a firm’s
NAV with independent valuation reports by professional appraisers. All REIT
IPOs in these four countries also involved “specified assets”; that is, all of the
properties that are to be injected into the REIT are identified in the prospectus
together with their independent valuation reports.4
To our knowledge, our study is the first to formally analyze the relationship
between REIT IPO pricing and NAV. In the first part of our empirical analysis,
we examine the initial day returns, measured as the percentage change on the
share price on their first trading day, of the sampled REIT IPOs to establish
2IRS Revenue Ruling 59-60, Section 5(b) stipulates that, “the value of the stock of a
closely held investment or real estate holding company, whether or not family owned,
is closely related to the value of the assets underlying the stock. For companies of
this type, the appraiser should determine the fair market values of the assets of the
company . . . adjusted net worth should be accorded greater weight in valuing the
stock of a closely held investment or real estate holding company, whether or not
family owned, than any other customary yardsticks of appraisal, such as earnings and
dividend paying capacity.” Source: National Association of Certified Valuators and
Analysts (NACVA, 2012).
3The asymmetric information explanation posits that one player in the IPO process
is better informed than the others (Allen and Faulhaber 1989, Grinblatt and Hwang
1989) and that large first-day returns can be interpreted as compensation to unin-
formed investors for bearing such risks (Rock 1986) or as remuneration to informed
investors for providing private information about the true value of the stock during
the premarketing or book-building exercise (Benveniste and Spindt 1989). However,
Ritter and Welch (2002) conclude that these asymmetric information models have
been overemphasized.
4In the United States, it is possible to list “blind pool” REITs; that is, the property
assets need not be identified in the prospectus. A “blind pool” REIT IPO usually
includes only an audited “balance sheet” of the new REIT. The capital raised will be
invested after the offering at the discretion of the sponsor pursuant to a predefined
investment strategy as outlined in the prospectus. For more information, see Pricewa-
terhouseCoopers (December 2011) “Roadmap for a REIT IPO–A Summary Guide to
Going Public.”
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Figure 1  Distribution of IPO pricing. This figure summarizes the distribution of
the average IPO pricing based on sample means. Panel A shows the total gain from
the average IPO, which is measured as the difference between first-day closing price
(C) and NAV per share (A). The portion of the gain between B and A represents the
net gain for the firm from IPO, while the portion of the gain between C and B
represents IPO underpricing. Panel B shows the issuer’s IPO filing range; the floor
price (D) and the ceiling price (E), relative to the NAV (A). NAV* (F) represents the
expected price level based on the prevailing peer-NAV premiums at the time of issue
and is defined as the NAV of IPO REIT multiplied by (one plus peer-NAV premium)
in which the peer-NAV premium is the median NAV premium among peers (all
REITs within the same country) at the time of the IPO. [Color figure can be viewed
at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
that underpricing is indeed evident with REIT IPOs. We then compare the
offer price with the fundamental value of the shares, measured by NAV. If
the offer price/NAV ratio of the shares is less than one, the issuers can be
inferred to have experienced a net loss from the public listing. However, if
the offer price/NAV ratio exceeds unity, the issuers have enjoyed a net gain
from the IPO.
The results are summarized in Panel A of Figure 1, which illustrates how an
underpriced IPO could still produce a net gain for the issuers. The difference
between the first-day closing price (C) and the NAV of the shares (A) times
the total number of shares represents the total gains from IPO. It reflects
the issuer’s ability to obtain a higher valuation on its real estate portfolio
by opting for a public listing as opposed to selling the assets in the parallel
private real estate market. REIT IPOs, similar to closed-end fund (CEF) IPOs
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traded on major stock exchanges, transform illiquid assets into liquid assets.5
On the basis that the discount rate for liquid assets should be lower than that
for the underlying illiquid assets, Cherkes, Sagi and Stanton (2009) argue that
a REIT could sell at a premium to NAV in equilibrium.6
The net gains from the IPO are shared between the issuer and investors with
the proportion based on the final offer price. The initial return of the average
REIT IPO is 3.08%,7 which is much lower than the initial returns recorded
by operating company IPOs. This is not unexpected, because REITs are
more transparent and easier to value than general firms.8 More interestingly,
Panel A of Figure 1 also shows that the offer price of the shares (B) is on
average 3.54% higher than their NAV (A). This difference, which represents
the net gain to the firm from IPO (vs. staying private), provides a rationale
for issuers and their underwriters to set the offer price below the first-day
closing price. The observation that a REIT IPO could be underpriced and yet
produce a net gain for the issuer is a new contribution to the literature.
In practice, most IPOs engage in a book-building exercise during which in-
stitutional and large investors are invited to register their interests based on a
preliminary price range filed by the underwriters.9 In the context of a REIT
going public, there are two potential reference points for the underwriters to
anchor the IPO price range. As postulated earlier, the firm’s NAV is an impor-
tant reference point to compute IPO gains (or losses), because the issuer could
sell the physical assets in the alternative private real estate market at their full
market value (Chan, Wang and Yang 2009). Another reference point for IPO
5We thank Jay Ritter for highlighting this. Clayton and MacKinnon (2000) also high-
light that a major difference between CEFs and REITs is the relative degree of
difference in the liquidity of fund units (or shares) and the assets that CEFs or REITs
hold. Specifically, real estate assets owned by REITs tend to be less liquid than the
securities held by CEFs.
6However, the present value of the management fees would offset part or all of the
liquidity transformation strategy. Ooi (2009) observes that the average compensation of
REIT managers in Singapore is approximately 0.54% of the assets under management
(AUM).
7The amount of money on the table is equal to the price increase on the first day of
trading times the total number of shares issued. Note that the issuer also receives part
of the money left on the table in proportion to the number of shares retained by the
issuer.
8Other studies that examine the pricing of REIT IPOs also recorded first day returns
that are generally much lower than those observed for common IPOs (Wang, Chan
and Gau 1992, Below, Zaman and McIntosh 1995, Ling and Ryngaert 1997, Brounen
and Eichholtz 2002, Wong, Ong and Ooi 2013).
9Benveniste and Spindt (1989) provide a good discussion on the premarketing activities
involved in an IPO.
108 Ooi, Mori and Wong
underwriters to consider would be the firm’s NAV adjusted by the prevailing
peer-NAV premiums (we define this as NAV*), which incorporates additional
information about the prevailing market premium/discount on NAVs around
the time of filing the preliminary price range. To gain additional insights into
how REIT IPOs are priced, we further analyze the preliminary price range,
namely, the floor price and the ceiling price, filed by the underwriters relative
to the share’s NAV as well as NAV*.
Panel B of Figure 1 shows that the difference between the NAV (A) and the
floor price (D) of the filing range is small (−0.87%) and statistically insignif-
icant, suggesting that the reserve price of the IPO shares is pegged close to
their intrinsic value. The issuers’ reluctance to register a net loss from IPO by
transferring their assets to the newly listed REITs at below their market value
is logical because the properties could be sold directly, either individually
or as a portfolio, to other investors, including existing publicly traded REITs
(Chan, Wang and Yang 2009). The ceiling price (E) of the filing range,
on the other hand, is set well above (6.56%) the firm NAV. It is, however,
only slightly above NAV* (F) (1.23%, not statistically significant). The final
offer price is also close to NAV* (−0.96%, statistically insignificant). These
observations combined suggest that underwriters are firstly careful to avoid
any missed opportunity due to filing a too low ceiling price and, second, in-
formation contained in the NAV premiums of existing publicly traded REITs
is incorporated into the IPO preliminary distribution price and offer price.
In the second part of the empirical analysis, we examine how IPO pricing
is affected by market condition and large investors’ reception during the
roadshow. The underwriters, by timing the listings to coincide with favorable
conditions in the stock market, seek to price the IPO stocks above their intrin-
sic value to generate a net gain for the issuers. The underwriters also gather
useful information during the roadshow which could be used to determine the
final offer price and allocation of the IPO. As shown in Figure 2, we find that
REITs tend to go public during periods when the stock prices of their peers
are at a premium to NAV because the bullish valuation in the capital market,
which is when underlying assets are more highly valued in the capital market
than in the private market, allows issuers to price the new shares above
their NAVs. This market-timing behavior is consistent with the “windows of
opportunity” hypothesis whereby firms take advantage of transitory windows
by issuing equity offerings when their stocks are substantially higher than
the fundamental value of their underlying assets (Loughran and Ritter 1995,
Buttimer, Hyland and Sanders 2005; Boudry, Kallberg and Liu 2010).
In the third part of our empirical study, we examine the possible effects
of pricing the IPO stocks above their fundamental value on their initial day
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Figure 2  Price/NAV premium of REITs (Jan 2002–Dec 2014). Chart A tracks the
monthly NAV premium (closing price/NAV per share) and the volume of Asian
REIT IPOs between 2002 and 2014. The vertical axis on the left-hand side
represents the total number of IPOs in the corresponding month, whereas the vertical
axis on the right-hand side represents the median NAV premium. Chart B tracks the
yearly NAV premium and the volume of all Asian IPOs (not just REITs) between
2002 and 2014 in each of the four Asian stock markets. The vertical axis on the
left-hand side (bar chart) represents the total number of IPOs in the corresponding
year (by country), whereas the vertical axis on the right-hand side represents the
median NAV premium. [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
return and long-run performance (over 100-day, one-year and three-year hold-
ing periods). Due to the market-timing behavior of issuers, we expect that
the initial day return is correlated with the issuer’s net gain and that the stock
price will revert to its fundamental level over a longer period. We test these
propositions by examining whether the initial day return and long-run per-
formance of REIT IPOs are related to issuers pricing the IPO stocks above
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their fundamental value by timing the IPO during bullish valuation in the
capital market. As predicted, we find that issuers’ net gain is positively re-
lated to the initial day returns and negatively to firm performance over longer
horizons.
In summary, the findings suggest that the average REIT IPO is able to create
wealth for both the investors and the issuer in the short run, but it under-
performs over longer horizons as the bullish stock price readjusts back to
its fundamental level. Conversely, we find that the offer price premium over
NAV* is not significantly related to the initial day returns, suggesting that
underwriters have incorporated information contained in the prevailing mar-
ket premium when setting the offer prices. The long-run performance of the
REIT IPOs are, however, positively related to the offer price premium over
NAV*, which is not surprising, as REITs that hold high-quality properties
and or have better growth prospects are expected to have superior long-run
performance over their peers.
Our article proceeds as follows. The “Why REITs” section provides the
relevant institutional background on REITs. The “Data” section describes the
data employed. The “Results” section contains the empirical results. The last
section provides our conclusions.
Why REITs
REITs are special investment entities set up to invest in and own real estate
assets collectively. To qualify as a REIT, a firm must meet several require-
ments. First, at least 75% of its total assets must be in real estate. Second,
a significant portion of its gross income must come from real estate-related
sources, such as rents. Third, it must pay out a significant portion (at least
90%) of its taxable income as dividends. As an investment vehicle, a REIT
enjoys tax transparency status, meaning that it is not subject to corporate
income tax. Thus, there is no tax advantage for a REIT to have debt in its
capital structure (see Ooi, Ong and Li 2010).
Essentially, two approaches exist to determine the true value of stocks. The
most common method for valuing firms going public is to use comparable firm
multiples.10 However, Ritter and Welch (2002) warn that the accounting data
of newly listed firms might not be reliable because they are usually valued on
10Studies that have employed comparable firm multiples to estimate the fundamental
value of IPO firms include Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004), Pukthuanthong-Le
and Varaiya (2007), Jagannathan and Gao (2004) and Campbell et al. (2008).
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the basis of their growth options.11 In contrast, the NAV valuation approach
involves determining the fair market value of the assets owned by a firm. This
approach may not be easily employed to value firms that carry their assets on
the balance sheet at historical cost (less accumulated depreciation). To revise
the NAV of these firms, a stock analyst adjusts the book value of the assets to
their fair market value, typically by applying broad assumptions and desktop
calculations. Furthermore, the estimation of a firm’s asset value is complicated
by the presence of intangible assets, such as trademarks, patents, goodwill, or
alliances. Nonetheless, the relatively straightforward nature of property assets
has led many stock analysts to value REITs by their underlying asset holdings
(Capozza and Seguin 2003, Gentry, Jones and Mayer 2003). Gentry, Jones
and Mayer (2004) propose that REITs’ price/NAV ratios are more reliable
than those of operating firms, because they are backed by property appraisals,
which involve a physical inspection of each assessed property by independent
appraisers who are specialists in their field.
Another advantage of using data from a single industry, and on REITs in
particular, is the reduction of potentially confounding effects attributable to
differences in risk, transparency and growth potential (Hartzell, Kallberg and
Liu 2005). REITs are more homogenous, because they hold real assets and
face similar growth constraints. Therefore, they can be viewed as good peers
for valuation purposes (Chan, Chen and Wang 2013). Hartzell, Kallberg and
Liu (2008) find that REIT IPOs exhibit lower prediction errors (19%) relative
to IPOs of general firms (40%). This leads them to conclude that REITs are
relatively easy to value, even using simple comparables, because they exhibit
less cross-sectional variations in pricing.12
Given the dual markets for real estate assets, REITs also provide a good labo-
ratory for tracking how real estate stocks could deviate from their fundamental
values in the private real estate market. Analyzing a sample of U.S. REITs
that traded during the period of 1990–2003, Gentry, Jones and Mayer (2004)
note that, although the median price/NAV ratio was 1.01, it varies signifi-
cantly over time. Specifically, the median value increased to higher than 1.20
11The dividend capitalization model can be further simplified if a constant growth rate
g is assumed over an infinite time horizon and if the discount rate k is greater than the
growth rate g. This result is the familiar Gordon dividend discount model, where P0= D/(k – g), where D is dividend per share. Ritter and Welch (2002) highlight that the
prior rapid growth of many young companies makes it easy to justify high valuations
by investors who want to believe that they have identified the next Microsoft.
12Hartzell, Kallberg and Liu (2008) compare a rough estimate of prediction errors
for REIT IPO pricing to that documented by Kim and Ritter (1999) for general
corporations. Using the median Q for all seasoned REITs to predict a REIT IPO’s Q,
their mean absolute prediction error is less than half as large as that in Kim and Ritter.
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for all of 1997 and decreased to lower than 0.90 for most of 2000.13 Clayton
and MacKinnon (2000) further attribute the variations over time to changing
investment sentiment in the REIT market.14 Linking the price/NAV ratio to
REIT capital structure decisions, Boudry, Kallberg and Liu (2010) find that
REITs are more likely to issue equity when their price/NAV is trading higher
than one, which generally coincides with the capital market valuing the cash
flows of the underlying property portfolio more highly than the private mar-
ket. During these periods, the cost of equity in the public market is relatively
cheaper than that in the private market. Ling, Ooi and Xu (2016) examine the
impact of asset growth rates on the future stock performance of 308 publicly
traded REITs and find evidence that the growth effect is significantly less
negative for REITs selling at a premium to NAV.15
Data
Our study sample covers all REIT IPOs listed between 2001 and 2013 on
four stock exchanges in Asia, namely, Japan, Singapore, Hong Kong and
Malaysia. All REITs in these countries are equity REITs (that is, there are
no mortgage REITs or hybrid REITs). It should be noted that Asian REITs
are relatively new. The first two REITs in Japan were listed in September
2001, followed by Singapore’s maiden REIT listing in 2002. In 2005, REIT
markets took off in Hong Kong and Malaysia. Table A1 in the Appendix
provides a comparison of the REIT structures in these four markets. The
guidelines in these markets are generally similar, but to account for possible
differences across markets, we compute IPO volume, peer pricing and market
performance using information for the respective markets.
13Several studies have also investigated the equilibrium relationship between the NAV
and market capitalizations of non U.S. REITs. Barkham and Ward (1999) find that
U.K. property stocks trade, in general, at a discount to their NAV. Patel, Pereira and
Zavodov (2009) report a tendency for the NAV discount of U.K. REITs to revert to
the long-term mean value of 20%. While Liow (2003) also finds some evidence of
mean reversion behavior of Singapore property stocks towards their NAV, he notes
that the speed of reversion is slow and deviations between the two markets’ valuation
could therefore be prolonged.
14Recent studies in behavioral finance present evidence that investor sentiment has
a significant impact on stock prices. Lee, Shleifer and Thaler (1991) attribute the
divergence of the stock price from the NAV of closed-end funds to investor sentiment.
Baker and Wurgler (2006) attribute stock mispricing to an uninformed demand shock
in the presence of a binding arbitrage constraint.
15Ling, Ooi and Xu (2016) highlight the existence of a parallel private market that
allows a listed REIT to potentially arbitrate its observed cost of capital advantage or
disadvantage. More specifically, a REIT can permanently increase its NAV and create
shareholder value by funding asset growth when NAV premiums are positive and by
buying back stock or paying off debt with the proceeds from the sale of properties
when its stock is selling at a discount to NAV.
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Table 1 shows the fluctuating number of REIT IPO issues during the 13-year
study period that spans different market cycles: 2001–2004 coincided with a
slow market, whereas 2005–2007 marked the hottest IPO wave, with a total of
60 offerings. The number of IPOs dried up in 2008–2009 primarily because
of the global financial crisis, which saw many IPO sponsors postponing their
listing plans.16 The number of IPOs started to increase again in 2012.
Our initial sample covers 112 equity REIT IPOs. Two IPOs had to be omitted
from the study sample because of missing data. Another three IPOs (Capita-
Land Commercial Trust, Ascott Residence Trust and K-REIT Asia) involved
spin-offs—events during which shares of new firms are distributed (either
freely or at a heavily discounted price) to existing shareholders of issuing
firms—and were also omitted.17 The final sample of 107 IPOs covered 94%
of the total listed REITs in Asia based on their market value. Data on the
IPOs, financial attributes and REIT performances during the study period
were extracted from Bloomberg. Information on the stock ownership of spon-
sors and institutional investors was hand collected from the listing prospectus.
Information on the NAV per share, which is defined as the REIT’s total as-
sets minus total liabilities scaled by total shares outstanding after the IPO,
are extracted from the IPO prospectus for Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singa-
pore REITs and from the financial statements of Japanese REITs. In contrast,
U.S. REITs are not required to report the appraised value of their properties;
therefore, their NAVs are not directly observed.18
All of the sampled REIT IPOs engage in a book-building exercise during
which institutional investors are invited to register their interest.19 The under-
writer first estimates an offer price range for the shares, and then conducts
16The following eight REIT IPOs were pulled: Sunlight REIT (May 2006), Regal
REIT (September 2006), AIG J-REIT (November 2007), Dynasty REIT (October
2012), SPH REIT (May 2013), Lotte Shopping REIT (February 2014), Manulife U.S.
REIT (June 2015) and APL Japan Trust (October 2017). The main reason for pulling
these IPOs is the deterioration in the capital market that would adversely affect the
IPO offer price and take-up rate. In most instances, the market NAV premium declined
during the premarketing period.
17Note that all REITs in these four countries are equity REITs. Mortgage REITs and
hybrid REITs do not exist. Additionally, all of the IPOs of these REITs involved
specified assets. Thus, we did not exclude any REIT IPOs except for those with
missing data and those that were spin-offs.
18Reliable NAVs are not widely available for seasoned U.S. REITs because their real
estate assets are not always marked to market value (Barkham and Ward 1999, Clayton
and MacKinnon 2000).
19Since its introduction, the book-building IPO procedure has dominated IPO auctions
in both the United States and globally, despite strong economic incentives in favor of
auctions. Degeorge, Derrien and Womack (2007) hypothesize that corporate issuers
and investment banks are in a quid pro quo relationship; that is, issuers are willing
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a “roadshow” to gauge the market’s reception to the issue. The roadshow is
designed by the issuer to both inform and educate investors and to solicit
information about the market’s reception to the issue. For example, investors
might express mild or strong interest at different prices within the under-
writer’s proposed range. The nonbinding indication of interest is used to
set the final offer price, which may fall anywhere within the lower and up-
per bound of the price range depending on the information extracted from
investors during the roadshow (Benveniste and Spindt 1989). The overallot-
ment option is normally exercised when premarket demand for the shares
exceeds expectations.20
For 93 of the IPOs, we were able to obtain the preliminary price range
filed by the underwriters for the roadshow. All IPOs were eventually priced
within the price range. The ceiling price of the IPO filing range reflects the
issuer’s optimism, and the floor price reflects the issuer’s reserve price, or
the minimum price for the IPO to proceed. In practice, the final offer price
is dictated by the market’s reception during the roadshow. If the IPO is well
received, the final offer price is likely to be fixed at the upper range of the
filing price. However, if the response is lukewarm, the final offer price is
likely to fall toward the lower range of the filing price. In our analysis, the
popularity of an IPO stock is gauged by the percentage difference between the
final offer price and the midpoint of the filling range. Of our sampled REIT
IPOs, 69.9% were eventually priced at or higher than the midpoint price
range, with 64.5% achieving the maximum filing price. The remaining 30.1%
were eventually priced lower than the midpoint price range, with 18.3% fixed
at the bottom of the price range.
Results
Distribution of IPO Pricing
We first examine the initial day returns (1st day close/offer price – 1)
of the sampled IPOs to determine whether IPO underpricing exists with
REIT IPOs. The traditional asymmetric information-based explanation for
IPO underpricing views underpricing as a result of uncertainty regarding the
true market value of the new entity (Rock 1986). Ritter and Welch (2002)
to pay the higher direct and indirect costs of book-building in exchange for increased
and more favorable research coverage.
20In general, an overallotment option allows underwriters to issue as many as 15%
more shares than originally planned. This option is also known as the “green shoe,”
after the name of the Green Shoe Manufacturing Company, which was the first to use
the clause in its underwriting agreement.
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argue that IPO underpricing disappears entirely when information asymmetry
approaches zero.21 To understand issuers’ rationale behind the IPO under-
pricing, we examine whether the IPOs are priced lower than the fundamental
value of the shares by comparing the offer price with its NAV. The offer price
premium to NAV (Offer price/NAV – 1) indicates if issuing firms enjoyed
net gains from IPOs. We further analyze the preliminary price range, namely,
the floor price and the ceiling price relative to the firm NAV. In addition, we
compare the first-day closing price with the ceiling price to examine if there
is a missed opportunity by setting a too-low ceiling price.
Table 2 reports the distribution statistics for the IPO pricing of REITs listed
between 2001 and 2013. We observe a statistically significant positive first-
day return averaging 3.08%, which is comparable to the 3.60% registered by
85 U.S. REIT IPOs from 1991 to 1994 (Ling and Ryngaert 1997). However,
the first-day returns are much lower than those observed for general stock
IPOs in Asian countries: 44.7% in Japan, 15.8% in Hong Kong, 25.8% in
Singapore and 56.2% in Malaysia (Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist 2017).22
The smaller degree of IPO underpricing for REIT IPOs indicates that there
is greater certainty over the fundamental values of REITs, which is not sur-
prising, because REITs operate under more stringent rules to protect retail
investors. Moreover, REITs own tangible real estate assets, which are not firm
specific.
More interestingly, Table 2 shows that the offer price of the stock is, on
average, 3.54% higher than its NAV. The median value of 3.63% is also
statistically significant. Panel B further shows that the offer price is equal to
or higher than NAV with 75.7% of REIT IPOs in our sample. Figure 1, which
illustrates the relationship among the first-day closing price, the offer price
and NAV, suggests that issuers can rationalize setting the offer price below the
first-day closing price (IPO underpricing), since the offer price is still greater
than the expected net sale price if the assets were sold in the private market.
Note that, in our sample, issuing fees for the average REIT IPO amount to
2.47% of NAV or 3.17% of the proceeds. Even after subtracting fees, the
premium ((Offer price-fees)/NAV – 1) is positive (0.27%). Considering that
selling assets in private market would require the total cost of approximately
21Empirical support for this prediction is provided by an early study by Peavy (1990),
who observes that the mean initial days’ return of 41 closed-end fund (CEF) IPOs in
the 1980s was not significantly different from zero.
22Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist (2017) is available on Jay Ritter’s Web site
(http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm). Initial returns of U.S. REIT IPOs are also
much lower than those of general IPOs, which averaged 17.9% during 1980–2016.
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5% in Asian countries, issuers were generally able to achieve net gains by
going public even after fees are considered.23
We next analyze the preliminary price range, namely, the floor price and the
ceiling price, relative to the firm NAV. The minimum price that is acceptable
to an issuer can be extracted from the floor price of the filing range. Because
the underlying property assets could be sold in the parallel private market,
issuers have little economic incentive to proceed with an IPO unless they can
obtain better pricing in the securitized market. In support, Table 2 shows that
the reserve price of the shares, the floor price, is pegged close (-0.87%) to
their intrinsic value (NAV). The ceiling price, on the other hand, is set well
above (6.56%) the firm NAV and very close to the first-day closing price. On
average, the ceiling price is only slightly below (0.73%) the first-day closing
price, and the difference is not statistically significant. This implies that the
ceiling price is generally set high enough to prevent any missed opportunity
for issuing firms.
To understand if the information about the market premium at the time of
issue is incorporated into the IPO pricing, we compare the first-day closing
price with the price level that would have been expected based on prevailing
peer-NAV premiums at the time of issue. Specifically, we calculate NAV*,
defined as the NAV of IPO REIT multiplied by (one plus peer-NAV premium)
where peer-NAV premium is the median NAV premium among peers (all
REITs within the same country) at the time of IPO. Table 2 shows that the
average first-day closing price is not significantly higher than NAV* (1.59%),
indicating that underwriters do take into consideration the market premium
of existing publicly traded REITs when setting the price range of the IPO.
Effects of Market Condition and Market Reception on IPO Pricing
To examine the effect of market conditions on IPO pricing, we separate the
IPOs into offerings made in hot, normal and cold issue markets defined us-
ing the IPO volume in the general stock market (not just REITs) in each
country. Following Lowry (2003), we classify periods at the top quartile of
IPO volume in the respective markets as hot IPO markets and those at the
bottom quartile as cold IPO markets. In addition to the prevailing market
condition, a particular IPO might also be popular during the premarket exer-
cise because of factors such as confidence in management, a good corporate
23The total cost of transferring properties in the direct market is approximately 5%,
which covers the brokerage fees, legal costs and stamp duties. Between 2005 and
2015, a tax concession was given to Singapore REITs that made them exempt from
the normal 3% stamp duty on acquisitions of local properties.
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Table 3  Effects of market condition and market reception on IPO pricing.
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Hot Normal Cold
Popular
IPOs
Unpopular
IPOs
IPO Pricing
1st day close/offer price - 1 4.68% 3.18% −1.33% 6.89% −4.09%
1st day close/ceiling price - 1 −0.11% 1.46% −4.13% 6.57% −10.42%
1st day close/NAV - 1 10.44% 7.0% 1.06% 14.63% −5.87%
Ceiling price/NAV - 1 7.94% 6.44% 5.06% 7.43% 4.90%
(Offer price)(1-fees)/NAV - 1 1.41% 0.17% −3.50% 3.39% −5.13%
Offer price/NAV -1 4.84% 3.44% 1.76% 7.08% −2.16%
Midpoint/NAV -1 3.61% 2.89% 0.99% 3.99% 0.67%
Floor price/NAV -1 −0.71% −0.65% −3.08% 0.54% −3.57%
1st day close/NAV* -1 2.39% 1.12% 5.17% −0.50% 3.38%
Celling price/NAV* -1 4.63% −0.48% 10.39% −6.95% 15.81%
Offer price/NAV* -1 −0.05% −1.80% 6.54% −7.30% 7.54%
Midpoint/NAV* -1 0.03% −3.82% 6.05% −9.88% 10.93%
Floor price/NAV* -1 −4.57% −7.16% 1.72% −1.28% 6.06%
Note: This table presents the mean values for the IPO for a sample of REITs listed
in Asia between 2001 and 2013. In columns [1]–[3], the IPOs are partitioned into
hot issue, normal issue and cold issue markets on the basis of the total volume of
IPO issues in the respective markets from 2000 to 2013. Periods at the top quartile
of the IPO volume are classified as hot issue markets, and those at the bottom 25%
are classified as cold issue markets. In columns [4] and [5], IPOs are partitioned
into popular and nonpopular IPO stocks on the basis of the market’s reception to the
individual offerings. Whenever the final offer price is higher than the midpoint of the
book-building price range, the IPO is classified as a popular stock.
governance structure and/or attractive pricing of the shares. Therefore, we
also separate the IPOs on the basis of the market’s reception to the individual
offering. Whenever the final offer price is higher (lower) than the midpoint of
the book-building price range, the IPO is classified as a popular (unpopular)
stock. Hanley (1993), Ritter (1998) and Aggarwal, Prabhala and Puri (2002)
employ a similar approach to measure the popularity of individual IPOs.
Table 3 summarizes the IPO pricing range across different market conditions.
First, it shows that the average initial day return is positive for the sample
of IPOs issued in hot (4.68%) and normal (3.18%) markets and with popular
IPOs (6.89%), but is negative for IPOs issued in cold markets (−1.33%) and
with unpopular IPOs (−4.09%). Second, the offer price is higher than the
NAV in all market conditions even in cold markets (1.76%), while the offer
price is lower than the NAV with unpopular IPOs (−2.16%). The results
generally support that issuers set the offer price above their asset values
regardless of the market condition, while the level of net gains of issuing
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firms is affected by the market condition. With unpopular IPOs, issuers suffer
net losses if they choose to proceed with the IPO offerings.
The floor price is set close to the firm’s NAV except in cold markets (−3.08%)
and with unpopular IPOs (−3.57%). The first-day closing price is not too
far from the NAV* in hot (2.39%) and normal (1.12%) markets and with
popular IPOs (-0.50%), but it is much higher than the NAV* in cold markets
(5.17%) and with unpopular IPOs (3.38%). This result implies that, when
the market condition is not supportive for IPOs and for the unpopular IPOs,
the prevailing market premium might not contain useful information for IPO
pricing, probably because these REITs are going public for unique reasons. It
is also notable that the first-day closing price is, not surprisingly, much lower
than the ceiling price in cold markets (−4.13%) and with unpopular IPOs
(−10.42%).
Table 3 previously indicates that issuers generally priced the IPO stocks
much higher than their fundamental values by timing the listings to avoid
unfavorable conditions in the IPO market. To examine this trend further,
Figure 2 tracks the NAV premium and the volume of REIT IPOs during the
study period.
Chart A tracks the NAV premium and the volume of Asian REIT IPOs at
the aggregate level, while Chart B tracks the NAV premium and the volume
of all IPOs (including general stocks and REIT stocks) in each of the four
markets. The two charts show that the trend of general stock IPOs generally
mimics REIT IPOs in the Asian countries during the study period, with high
IPO volumes during 2005–2007 and after 2012 and low IPO volumes during
2008–2009. Therefore, to define market conditions, we use IPO volumes of
general stock markets to better capture the capital market conditions because
the Asian REIT markets were nascent and thin during our study period.
The data also show a close linkage between IPO volume and stock market
condition, indicative of issuers’ practice of timing their IPO offerings when
the underlying assets are more highly valued in the capital market than in the
private market. The bullish valuation in the capital market helped issuers to
price shares higher than the NAV and to achieve a final offer price that is
at the top of the filing range. This market-timing behavior is consistent with
the “windows of opportunity” hypothesis, whereby firms take advantage
of transitory windows by issuing equity offerings when their stocks are
substantially higher than the fundamental value of their underlying assets
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(Loughran and Ritter 1995, Buttimer, Hyland and Sanders 2005, Boudry,
Kallberg and Liu 2010).24
To understand the determinants of the initial-day return and the long-run
returns of individual IPOs, we run a set of regressions. The initial-day return
is represented by the difference between the first-day closing price and the
offer price of the shares, normalized by the offer price, while the long-run
returns are represented by their buy-and-hold returns (BAHRs) for 100-day,
one-year and three-year periods after the first trading day. This value is
measured as the raw BAHR of the IPO stock minus the contemporaneous
BAHR of the respective general stock market index. As previously noted, the
initial-day return averaged 3.08%. BAHRs are −1.31%, −0.35% and 2.22%
for 100-day, one-year and three-year periods, respectively.
Table 4 presents the definitions and summary statistics of the dependent
and explanatory variables in the regression models. The key explanatory
variable in our regression models is the offer price premium over the NAV
(OFFER NAV). A positive relationship between OFFER NAV and the initial-
day return implies that, even with the IPO underpricing, issuers still gain
from favorable valuations of the properties transferred to the newly listed
REIT. However, we expect that the coefficients of OFFER NAV in the long-
run performance regression models to be negative as the bullish stock prices
readjust back to their fundamental level.
To examine the pricing of new IPO firms relative to their peers, we also
include the offer price premium over the peer-adjusted NAV (OFFER NAV*).
A significant effect of OFFER NAV* on the initial return would imply that
the prevailing market premium contains relevant information that was not
fully incorporated in the offer price. Also, as a proxy for quality and/or
growth prospect, we expect OFFER NAV* to have a direct relationship with
the long-run performance of the individual IPOs. To account for the effects of
market condition and market reception on the initial return and the long-run
performance, we include variables for both hot and cold issuing markets and
popularity of an IPO at the stock level.25
24As discussed earlier, Boudry, Kallberg and Liu (2010) find that REITs are more likely
to issue seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) when their price/NAV is trading higher than
1 because, in this scenario, the cost of equity in the public market is cheaper than
that in the private market. Buttimer, Hyland and Sanders (2005) similarly observe that
REIT IPOs in the United States usually coincide with periods when REIT share prices
were at a premium to their NAVs.
25As noted earlier, we identify popular IPOs by computing the percentage difference
between the final offer price and the midpoint of the filing range of each IPO. When-
ever the final offer price is higher than the midpoint of the book-building price range,
the IPO is classified as a popular stock.
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We also include a set of control variables in the regression models, namely,
the sponsor’s ownership (S OWNERSHIP) and reputation (S REPUTATION),
the underwriter’s reputation (U REPUTATION), institutional holdings (IN-
STITUTIONAL) and issue size (IPO SIZE). To control for scaling effects,
natural logarithms are employed for S OWNERSHIP and IPO SIZE. We also
control for fixed effects related to property type and the market economy as
well as a binary variable for maiden issue (FIRST) if the IPO is the first of a
particular property type in the market economy. Kallberg, Liu and Srinivasan
(2004) find that the quality of a real estate limited partnership decreases with
each successive partnership issued by a given sponsor. To control for market
learning in the initial return regressions, we created a numerical variable that
captures the sequence of the IPOs done by each sponsor; e.g., this variable
takes the value of 1 for the very first IPO done by a sponsor, 2 for the second
IPO done by the same sponsor and so on (MARKET LEARNING). We control
for liquidity (LIQUIDITY) in the initial return regressions using the bid-ask
spread (the difference between the asking price and the bidding price scaled
by the mid-price on the IPO date).26
Table 4 shows that the offer price premium over NAV averages 3.54%. The
IPO offer price was, on average, 1.01% higher than the midpoint of the
book-building price range. The sponsors retained approximately 22.66% of
the shares, which is comparable to post-IPO holdings of 23–26% for venture
capital sponsors (Barry et al. 1990, Megginson and Weiss 1991, Gompers
and Lerner 1999). On average, institutional investors hold 43.32% of Asian
REITs’ stocks, which is close to the 44% observed by Hartzell, Kallberg
and Liu (2008) for U.S. REIT IPOs. The average size of REIT IPOs is
$412.3 million, ranging from a minimum of $21.8 million to a maximum of
$2.84 billion. In comparison, the average size of REIT IPOs in the United
States ranges from $176 million (Ling and Ryngaert 1997) to $202 million
(Gokkaya et al. 2015). Of the offerings, 15.9% (7.5%) were issued during
hot (cold) issue markets, respectively. The total number of IPOs performed
by each sponsor ranges from 1 to 6, with a mean value of 1.3. The liquidity
value of 0.5% represents the average bid-ask spread scaled by mid-price on
IPO date. The magnitude of the variance inflation factor (VIF) ranges from
1.12 to 2.81, indicating that multicollinearity is not a serious issue in the
regression models.
Determinants of Initial-Day Return
Table 5 reports the estimation results for the initial day return. Model 1 is
estimated using OLS. Because the amount of money left on the table is a
26Clayton and MacKinnon (2002) show that liquidity is a component of the NAV
premium.
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Table 5  Determinants of initial day return.
Model 1 (OLS) Model 2 (2SLS)
Initial Day Return Initial Day Return
INTERCEPT −0.03 −0.10
(−0.4) (−0.9)
OFFER NAV 0.28* 0.26**
(1.8) (2.1)
OFFER NAV* −0.07 −0.03
(−1.3) (−0.4)
POP STK 1.36*** 1.46***
(3.0) (3.4)
HOT MKT 0.00 −0.01
(0.1) (−0.2)
COLD MKT −0.04 −0.01
(−1.6) (−0.2)
S OWNERSHIP 0.60** 2.52***
(2.3) (3.1)
S REPUTATION −0.02 −0.06*
(−1.0) (−1.8)
U REPUTATION −0.78 −0.64
(−1.6) (−1.3)
INSTITUTIONAL 0.10 0.35***
(1.6) (2.8)
IPO SIZE −0.04 −0.08*
(−1.0) (−1.9)
FIRST 0.09*** 0.10***
(3.5) (2.9)
MARKET LEARNING 0.06*** 0.04***
(3.3) (2.8)
LIQUIDITY −0.98 9.53
(−0.3) (1.4)
Country-fixed effects Yes Yes
Property-type fixed effects Yes Yes
# of observations 88 88
R2 0.61 0.32
Note: This table reports estimates of the OLS (Model 1) and 2SLS (Model 2) regres-
sions to examine the determinants of the IPOs’ initial-day return. The right-hand side
variables are defined in Table 4. The instrument variable for the 2SLS is firm size,
which is measured by the natural log of the REIT’s market capitalization. t-Statistics
are reported in the parentheses with robust standard errors. ***, ** and * refer to
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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function of two decisions, namely, the degree of underpricing and the number
of shares sold (Loughran and Ritter 2002), the percentage of shares retained by
the issuer (S OWNERSHIP) might be endogenous in Model 1. As a robustness
check, we reestimate the IPO underpricing and proportion of shares retained
by the sponsors using a two-stage least squares (2SLS) IV regression that uses
FIRM SIZE (natural log of the market capitalization of individual REITs) as
the instrument variable. The estimation involves regressing S OWNERSHIP
against all covariates and the instrument variable and then using the predicted
value of S OWNERSHIP to estimate the underpricing equation. The regression
results are reported in Table 5 under Model 2.27 In each of the regressions,
we also control for property- and country-fixed effects.
As predicted, the coefficient for OFFER NAV is positive and statistically sig-
nificant in both models. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that an
underpriced IPO can still generate a net gain for the issuing firm. Therefore,
the average IPO creates wealth for both investors and issuers (refer also to
Figure 1). The positive relation between OFFER NAV and first-day returns
indicates that when a larger net gain is targeted by the issuing firm, investors
require higher initial returns too. OFFER NAV*, on the other hand, is not
significant, implying that there is no remaining information in the prevailing
market premium that affects initial-day returns. This suggests that underwrit-
ers have incorporated useful information contained in the prevailing market
premium in setting the offer price.
After controlling for the popularity of IPOs during the pre-market period
(POP STK), we find that the coefficients for HOT MKT and COLD MKT are
not statistically significant in explaining the initial-day return.28 The coeffi-
cient for POP STK is positive and highly significant in both models. This
is indicative of the effect of excess demand for shares spilling over to the
secondary market; that is, investors who were not successful in the alloca-
tion exercise resorted to buying shares in the open market, and their actions
increased the shares’ first-day closing price. It is likely that IPO stocks that
27To derive consistent estimates, the instrument must fulfill two conditions: it must
be uncorrelated with the error term, but is highly correlated with S OWNERSHIP.
In our case, the instrument variable is justified because its correlation with the error
term is only 0.059 and statistically insignificant. The instrument variable also passed
the standard diagnostic test for weak instruments; that is, the F-statistic of 11.646 is
higher than the rule of thumb of 10. For ease of exposition, the result of the 1st stage
regression is not shown in Table 5. The significant variables in the 1st stage regression
are S REPUTATION, INSTITUTIONAL, IPO SIZE, LIQUIDITY and FIRM SIZE.
28Recall that hot (cold) IPO markets are classified as periods at the top (bottom)
quartile of IPO volume in the year of the offering. Insignificant results remain when
the cut-off point for defining hot (cold) markets is increased to 30% of the IPO volume.
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attract a high level of interest from institutional and retail investors leads to
underwriters exercising the overallotment option. The regression results are
robust when we redefine popular IPO stocks as offerings with an overallot-
ment.29 In summary, Table 5 indicates that the market reception of individual
IPO stocks has a significant influence on the initial-day return, while the
prevailing market condition of the general IPO market does not.
The regression results also indicate that the number of shares retained by the
issuers (S OWNERSHIP) plays a significant role in determining IPO under-
pricing. The positive coefficient indicates that issuers who sell proportionately
fewer shares underprice the IPO to a greater degree. This is not surprising be-
cause issuers also stand to benefit from the initial price run-up on their retained
shares (Loughran and Ritter 2002). The coefficient for INSTITUTIONAL has
the predicted positive sign and is statistically significant in Model 2, which
suggests that a greater degree of underpricing is required to entice institu-
tional investors to buy IPO stocks. This is consistent with the winners’ curse
hypothesis that predicts a higher level of IPO underpricing in the presence
of more institutional holdings. Meanwhile, the positive and significant coef-
ficient for FIRST reflects the valuation uncertainty associated with the listing
of pioneering REITs in the respective markets (Ling and Ryngaert 1997).30
While the underwriter’s reputation (U REPUTATION) does not impact the
newly listed firm’s initial performance, Model 2 shows that the issuer’s rep-
utation (S REPUTATION) has an inverse relationship with the degree of IPO
underpricing. Market learning is surprisingly positive and significantly related
to underpricing, implying that investors required higher discounts for the IPOs
done by sponsors that experienced more previous REIT IPOs. This discount
seems to represent a compensation for potential agency costs faced by a newly
listed REIT, because its future property acquisitions and competition for ten-
ants could be subordinated to existing REITs managed by the same sponsor.31
Liquidity does not affect initial returns beyond the effects of other variables.
29We could alternatively define POP STK by the number of overallotment shares
exercised divided by the total shares offered in the IPO. However, this identifica-
tion strategy may cause an endogeneity problem because the overallotment option is
exercised post-IPO.
30To capture the potential effect of underpricing decreasing over time as investors
become more familiar with the new product, we also substituted FIRST with the
natural logarithm of the number of days since the first REIT in the market segment
was listed (Ling and Ryngaert 1997). The results are qualitatively the same as for
FIRST.
31This conflict of interest is evident especially among REITs in Asia that adopt the
externally managed structure in which IPO sponsors continue providing assets and
management services to their REITs after IPOs (Lecomte and Ooi 2013, Downs et al.
2016).
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In summary, we find that the initial-day return is positively related to the
offer price premium to NAV and popularity of IPOs. Both the issuers and the
investors gained from the IPO. Investors gained from the IPO underpricing,
whereas issuers also gained from transferring the assets to a publicly listed
entity at a premium to their intrinsic value.
Determinants of Long-Run Performance
Table 6 reports the estimation results for the long-run performance. As pre-
sented earlier, the long-run returns are represented by the individual REIT
IPOs’ BAHRs for the 100-day, one-year and three-year periods after the first
trading day. This value is measured as the raw BAHR of the IPO stock minus
the contemporaneous BAHR of the respective general stock market index.
The BAHRs are measured against the general stock market index (left panel)
and the REIT market (right panel) in the respective countries. Since the main
results do not change greatly, we base our following discussions on the left
panel of Table 6.
As expected, OFFER NAV has a significant negative effect on the one-year
(Model 2) and the three-year (Model 3) long-run performance. While the
negative effect is also observed for these IPO stocks for the 100-day horizon
(Model 1), the coefficient is not significant. This is most likely due to the lock-
up period during which company insiders are not allowed to sell any of their
shares.32 OFFER NAV* (the offer price premium over peer-adjusted NAV),
on the other hand, shows strongly significant positive effects on the long-run
performance against general stocks for all horizons (Models 1–3). A higher
OFFER NAV* indicates that the IPO REIT holds high-quality properties and
or has better growth prospects compared to its peers. Thus, it is natural to
observe better long-run performances with such IPO REITs.
The regression coefficients of POP STK, HOT MKT and COLD MKT are sta-
tistically insignificant for the 100-day horizon (Model 1). HOT MKT shows
a positive significant effect in Model 2, and POP STK shows a positive sig-
nificant effect in Model 3. These results suggest that stock popularity, bullish
market condition and bearish market conditions during the offering do not
have any effect on the short-run (100-day) underperformance of IPOs, while
bullish market conditions and stock popularity affect the long-run perfor-
mance over one-year or three-year horizons to some extent.
32The minimum lock-up period, typically 90 days, provides a commitment to the
market that insiders will not immediately cash out their shareholdings following the
IPO (see Chen, Chen and Huang 2012).
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The proportion of shares retained by issuers (S OWNERSHIP) and the propor-
tion of shares allocated to institutional investors (INSTITUTIONAL) have pos-
itive impacts on stock underperformance that is observed during the first 100
days. Interestingly, the result shows that the stock performance of IPO REITs
is negatively associated with the reputation of sponsors (S REPUTATION) for
one-year and three-year horizons (Models 2 and 3).
Conclusions
The article examines issuers’ rationale behind the IPO underpricing. We use
a sample of REIT IPOs listed in four Asian markets (Malaysia, Japan, Hong
Kong and Singapore) from 2001 to 2013, which offers a good indication
of the listing firms’ fundamental values. Several interesting observations are
made. While the IPO underpricing is evident (3.1%) with REIT IPOs, we find
that issuers on average priced new issues 3.5% higher than their fundamental
values measured by firms’ NAVs. Thus, an IPO could be underpriced and
yet produce a net gain for the issuer from IPO, which is why issuers can
rationalize setting the offer price low relative to the first-day closing price. We
also find that underwriters are generally careful enough to avoid missing an
opportunity and incorporate the information contained in the market premium
of the existing publicly traded REITs in setting IPO pricing. Several significant
implications can be drawn from this study.
First, real estate owners can and do take advantage of “windows of opportu-
nity” to divest asset holdings through the IPO route (instead of selling them
directly in the private property market). Specifically, these owners favor the
IPO route when more value can be extracted through the public market. This
finding supports the IPO market-timing hypothesis (Baker and Wurgler 2002,
Lowry 2003).33 Our results also offer an explanation to yet another puzzle in
the IPO literature highlighted by Ritter and Welch (2002), which is why the
volume declines precipitously following a stock market decline. In a cold IPO
market, there is a quantity adjustment (that is, the number of IPOs declines)
rather than a price adjustment, because the issuer has to sell shares below
the NAV. Issuers who are averse to registering any net loss have the options
of either selling their assets in the private market or deferring the offering to
another time.
Second, our investigation shows that the IPO underpricing is mostly a product
of frothiness attributable to excess demand in the IPO market. Although the
33Previous studies by Lerner (1994) and Pagano and Zingales (1998) also show that the
industry’s high market-to-book ratios have a substantial effect on the firm’s decision
to go public.
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issuers could have exploited the situation by fully skimming the froth, the
evidence suggests that they do not. Because the offer price is already higher
than the intrinsic value of the assets (that is, what the assets could have
fetched if they had been sold in the private property market), issuers price
the shares slightly lower than their peers. Our main finding that IPOs can be
underpriced but represent a net gain for the issuing firm calls for alternative
methods of measuring the fundamental value for non-REIT new firms. Given
that issuers of non-REIT firms do leave money on the table, it is plausible to
expect that the IPOs of general stocks may also be priced higher than their
fundamental values, if measured correctly.
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